The Supreme Court recently granted a certiorari petition in Davis v. United States that presents the following questions: (1) Whether 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(B) is unconstitutionally vague; (2) whether Hobbs Act robbery is a “crime of violence” as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3); and (3) whether a prior Texas conviction for burglary is a “violent … Read more
Last week, the Supreme Court held in United States v. Stitt, Nos. 17-765 & 17-766, that the Armed Career Criminal Act’s (ACCA’s) definition of “violent felony” covers burglary statutes that criminalize unlawful entry into vehicles adapted or customarily used for overnight accommodation. As explained below, the decision does not appear to have any bearing on … Read more
This week the Supreme Court heard oral arguments in two cases addressing whether specific state offenses are violent felonies within the meaning of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA): Stokeling v. United States (Florida robbery statute that punishes takings by slight force), and United States v. Stitt (state burglary statutes that punish vehicle break-ins). The … Read more
A Second Circuit panel held today that, under the force clause of the subsequently revised U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2 (2014), all degrees of New York robbery are crimes of violence. United States v. Pereira-Gomez, No. 17-952 (2d Cir. 2018) (Cabranes, Carney, Caproni (SDNY)) (appeal from Azrack, J., EDNY), opinion available here. Despite this holding, practitioners are urged … Read more
Magistrate Judge Gold (SDNY) recently issued a Report & Recommendation (R&R), available here, concluding that third degree New York robbery, N.Y. Penal Law §160.05, is not a violent felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). See Baldwin v. United States, No. 16-CV-3350. Judge Korman has adopted the R&R. Judge Gold’s reasoning … Read more
Courtesy of Sentencing Resource Counsel Sissy Phleger. (See yesterday’s post for a quick take on Dimaya‘s implications for the Second Circuit’s holding, in United States v. Elvin Hill, that § 924(c)(3)’s residual clause is not constitutionally vague). — Today, in Sessions v. Dimaya, the Supreme Court struck down the residual clause in 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) as unconstitutionally vague. … Read more
Today, in Sessions v. Dimaya, the Supreme Court held in a long-awaited, 5-4 opinion that the residual clause definition of a “crime of violence” incorporated by the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 18 U.S.C. § 16(b), is unconstitutionally vague. Justice Kagan wrote the majority opinion, which Justice Gorsuch joined in relevant parts while also writing … Read more
It’s been a relatively slow week for the Second Circuit, but the Supreme Court recently granted cert. in Stokeling v. United States, 17-5554, a case concerning the definition of “violent felony” under the ACCA. Sentencing Resource Counsel Sissy Phleger has these details: The issue: Whether a state robbery offense that includes “as an element” the common … Read more
Today the Second Circuit held that three robberies committed on the same evening–within the same hour–were “committed on occasions different from one another” within the meaning of the ACCA. See United States v. Bordeaux, 17-486 (2d Cir. 2018) (Cabranes, Raggi, Vilardo (WDNY)). The opinion, available here, also holds that a subsection of Connecticut’s first-degree robbery statute, punishing robberies … Read more
In a disappointing but relatively narrow opinion, the Second Circuit held yesterday that first-degree New York robbery is a violent felony for purposes of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). The opinion in United States v. Stuckey, No. 16-4133 (Chin, Droney, Restani (Ct. Intl. Trade) (appeal from Oetken, J., SDNY), is available here. Significantly, the … Read more